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The Connecticut Recreational Use Statute:
Should a Municipality Be Immune
From Tort Liability?
I. Introduction
States have recognized that public access to recreation is an
important public policy,' and have sought cost-effective ways to
increase access to recreational lands. 2 One way has been to en-
courage private landowners to make their lands available for
public use by limiting landowner liability for personal injuries
suffered by recreational users of private property.3 This land-
owner limited liability has been accomplished through recrea-
1. See CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§ 1.2(H)(1), at 40 (1993). "The primary objective of the laws concerning public rec-
reation is to furnish recreational and aesthetic resources for accessible enjoyment
by a substantial segment of the population. A secondary objective ... is the en-
couragement of human health through exercise." Id.
Despite the rise in recreation consciousness, public recreation law is relatively
young, and there is no clear demarcation between public recreation and commer-
cial opportunity. Public recreation includes "hiking, viewing scenery, taking pho-
tographs, picnicking, hunting, fishing, and swimming.... [but in general] excludes
professional and school athletics, indoor amusements, and commercial recreational
activities on privately owned lands." Id. § 5.1(A), at 202. This distinction is based
on past practices, and the fact that fees have been traditionally charged for com-
mercial recreation activities. Id.
2. See Cori Leonard Ford, Digest of Selected Articles, 19 REAL EsT. L.J. 169,
171 (1990) (reviewing N. Linda Goldstein et al., Recreational Use Statutes-Time
for Reform, PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 1989, at 6).
3. Id. Under these statutes, the landowner is liable only for torts caused by
the landowner's wilful, reckless or grossly negligent conduct. De Milo v. West Ha-
ven, 458 A.2d 362,366-67 (Conn. 1983) (describing wilful conduct as encompassing
both the physical act proscribed by a statute as well as the resulting injury). See
also Soucy v. Wysocki, 96 A.2d 225, 228 (Conn. 1953) ("A wilful act is one that is
'intentional, wrongful and without just cause or excuse.'" (quoting Rogers v.
Doody, 178 A. 51, 53 (Conn. 1935))).
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tional use statutes.4 Under these statutes, the private
landowner benefits because he or she is freed from potential lia-
bility and the state benefits because it is given a free resource-
recreational land for its citizens-without the traditional bur-
den of having to buy or maintain the land.5 Recognizing these
advantages, the vast majority of states have passed versions of
the recreational use statute.6
The landowner, however, does not have blanket immunity from liability. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557h (West 1991). An owner is liable:
(1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous con-
dition, use, structure or activity; (2) for injury suffered in any case where the
owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for
the recreational use thereof, any consideration received by the owner for the
lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section.
Id. Under most circumstances, therefore, a private landowner who opens his or
her land to the public without charge for recreation, is given immunity from tort
liability. This statutory modification of private-owner liability in tort is an impor-
tant incentive to the landowner.
4. Ford, supra note 2, at 170.
5. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1965 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION
150-52 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 MODEL ACT]. In this publication, the Council of
State Governments states that:
Recent years have seen a growing awareness of the need for additional rec-
reational areas to serve the general public. The acquisition and operation of
outdoor recreational facilities by governmental units is on the increase.
However, large acreage of private land could add to the outdoor recreation
resources available.... [lUn those instances where private owners are will-
ing to make their land available to members of the general public without
charge, it is possible to argue that every reasonable encouragement should
be given to them.... Th[is] suggested [Model] [A]ct... is designed to en-
courage availability of private lands by limiting the liability of owners to
situations in which they are compensated for the use of their property and to
those in which injury results from malicious or willful acts of the owner.
Id.
6. Stuart J. Ford, Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: Towards
Sharpening the Picture at the Edges, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 491, 498 n.24. See ALA.
CODE §§ 35-15-20 to -28 (1991 & Supp. 1994); Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551
(1990 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 18-11-301 to -307, 18-11-401 to -406
(Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West 1974 & Supp. 1995);
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-41-101 to -105 (1984 & Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 52-557f to -557j (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 5901-047 (Michie
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 375.251 (West 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-20 to -26
(Michie 1982 & Supp. 1994); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 520-1 to -8 (1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 36-1604 (Michie 1994); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 745, 10/3-106 (Michie 1993);
IND. CODE § 14-2-6-3 (Michie 1990); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 461C.1 to .7 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to -3207 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 150.645 (Michie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9.2791, 9.2795 (West 1991); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West 1964 & Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN. NAT.
964
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In 1971 the Connecticut Legislature passed the Connecti-
cut Recreational Use Act, 7 which limits the liability of private
landowners who allow use of their lands by the public for recre-
ational purposes.8 Under the statute, the term "owner" is de-
fined as "the possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee,
occupant or person in control of the premises."9 Recent deci-
sions by the Connecticut Supreme Court have extended the defi-
nition of "owner" to include municipal or public landowners as
well. Contrary to the express intent of the Connecticut Legisla-
ture, such public landowners are extended the limited liability
intended solely for private landowners. 10
This Comment discusses the Connecticut recreational use
statute, and the recent case law extending immunity to munici-
pal landowners. Part II traces the general rule of tort liability
for actions occurring on one's property, the origin and develop-
ment of non-commercial public use of land for recreation, the
legislative intent behind recreational use statutes, and issues of
state sovereignty and municipal immunity. Part III discusses
RES. §§ 5-1101 to -1108 (Michie 1989); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 21, § 17C (West
1994); MicH. Comip. LAws ANN. § 300.201 (West 1984 & Supp. 1994); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to -7, 89-2-21 to -27 (1991); Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.345 to .348
(Vernon 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-16-301 to -302 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 37-1001 to -1008 (1993); NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.510 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 212.34 (1989); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:42A-2 to -8 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 17-4-7 (1988); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 9-103 (McKinney 1989); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to -06 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1993); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 1533.18 to .181 (Anderson 1986); OKLa STAT. tit. 76, §§ 10-15 (West 1987); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 105.655 to .680 (1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1 to -8 (West
1994); R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 32-6-1 to -7 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to -70
(Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 20-9-12 to -18 (1987 & Supp.
1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-101 to -105 (1987 & Supp. 1994); TFX. Crv. PRAc.
& REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.001 to -.003 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 57-14-1 to -7 (Michie 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5212 (1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 29.1-509 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.200 to .210
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 19-25-1 to -7 (Michie 1993 & Supp.
1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.525 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 34-19-
101 to -106 (1990). Alaska, North Carolina and the District of Columbia do not
have recreational use statutes.
7. 1971 Conn. Pub. Act. 249, codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557f to -
557j (West 1991).
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557g(a) (West 1991) ("[A]n owner of land who
makes all or any part of the land available to the public.., for recreational serv-
ices owes no duty of care to keep the land, or the part thereof so made available,
safe for entry or use by others for recreational purposes ...
9. Id. § 52-557f(3).
10. See infra part III.B.2.
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the current state of the law in Connecticut concerning immu-
nity under its recreational use statute, and also examines the
state of public recreation law in New York. Part IV focuses on
the Connecticut Supreme Court's interpretation of the recrea-
tional use statute in the landmark case of Manning v. Barenz"
as well as in the recent case of Scrapchansky v. Plainfield12
which includes a persuasive dissent against the court's ruling
on municipal immunity. Part V concludes that tort immunity
should not be granted to municipalities under recreational use
statutes, and that the legislature should redefine the statute
and address separately the question of municipal tort immu-
nity. Part V also recommends the value of the rationale set
forth by Justice Katz's dissenting opinion in Scrapchansky as a
guide in moving the law forward.
II. Background
A. Tort Liability for Owners of Land
Historically, owners and occupiers of land have enjoyed the
privilege of the ownership and use of their land, but they also
bear the concomitant responsibility of ensuring that no unrea-
sonable risk of harm is imposed on anyone using that land.' 3
Liability for the breach of this obligation could rest on any one
of the three categories of tort liability: (1) intentional conduct,
where an owner knowingly fails to warn of a danger that may
harm someone; (2) negligent conduct, where an owner allows an
unreasonable risk of harm to exist and harm, in fact, occurs to
another; and (3) strict liability, where an owner is liable simply
because certain activities are considered dangerous by their
very nature as a matter of social policy.' 4 Conditions on the
land that are dangerous, but occurring naturally, however, are
11. 603 A.2d 399 (Conn. 1992).
12. 627 A.2d 1329 (Conn. 1993).
13. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 57,
at 386-87 (5th ed. 1984).
14. Id. An example of intentional conduct is knowingly allowing some harm
to occur such as allowing noxious fumes to escape on the land. An example of
negligence is not exercising a reasonable amount of care which could prevent a
harm from occurring such as frightening horses pulling machinery by running a
gasoline engine in front of them, and causing them to bolt. An example of strict
liability is liability regardless of intention or negligence, but simply because of the




not considered part of the landowner's obligation to make the
land safe. 15 Therefore, the landowner would not be held liable
for harm caused by such naturally occurring dangerous
conditions. 16
In addition, when an injury occurs on the premises of an
owner, the extent to which the owner can be held liable will de-
pend on whether the visitor is a trespasser, a licensee, or an
invitee. 17 A number of jurisdictions have replaced the strict
classifications of trespasser, licensee and invitee in favor of a
single reasonable person under the circumstances standard.18
In Connecticut, however, the three-tiered classification is still
followed. 19
A trespasser is defined as "a person who enters or remains
upon land in the possession of another without a privilege.., by
the possessor's consent or otherwise."20 Because trespassers
come on land without permission, the possessor of land owes no
duty, and cannot be held liable for any misfortune that may
happen to the trespasser, even where the trespass was acciden-
tal.2 ' The owner is under no obligation to "guard a concealed
pitfall, a pond.., a dangerous electric wire, nor to keep a look-
out for [a trespasser] as he operates his machinery. ... "22 The
reasoning behind this rule appears to be that "in a civilization
based on private ownership, it is considered a socially desirable
policy to allow a person to use his own land in his own way,
without the burden of watching [out for] those who come there
without permission or right."23 An exception to this rule ap-
plies, however, when a trespasser constantly trespasses on a
limited area of the owner's land and thereby creates a "habit" of
attack people or certain abnormally dangerous activities like blasting with dyna-
mite. Id.
15. Id. at 390.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 393.
18. Maffeo v. Harbour Landing Condominium Ass'n, Inc., No. CIV 91-312944,
1994 WL 669701, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 22, 1994).
19. Id. (citing Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 612 A.2d 1197,
1199 (Conn. 1992)).
20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 58, at 393.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 394.




being there.24 In such cases of "tolerated intruders," the law
has imposed liability on the owner where the balance of the risk
of harm to the trespasser is much greater than the burden of
guarding against harm to the owner. 25 In addition, in all cases
the landowner has a duty to refrain from injuring a trespasser
by "wilful or wanton," rather than merely negligent, conduct.m
A licensee differs from a trespasser in that the licensee
comes on the land with the permission of the owner, although
the licensee enters the premises for the licensee's own purpose
rather than for a purpose of the owner.27 Still, the licensee
must enter at his or her own risk, and the owner is under no
obligation to inspect the premises to discover unknown dangers
or to give warning of dangers which should be obvious to the
licensee.2 Examples of persons included in this category are:
tourists, salespersons, people taking short cuts with the owner's
permission, people seeking refuge from the weather, and in-
vited social guests.m If, however, a dangerous condition is pres-
ent on the premises, and a licensee who habitually comes on the
land would not be aware of this danger, the owner must give
notice of the danger.30
An invitee enters an owner's land, with express or implied
permission, for the purpose of doing business with the land-
owner. Examples are customers in restaurants, banks, thea-
ters, beaches, and amusement parks.31 The owner is under an
obligation to inspect the premises and make them safe from po-
24. Id. at 396.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 397. The term "wilfufl" in civil proceedings denotes an act that is
intentional, knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. The term
"wanton means "reckless, heedless, malicious; characterized by extreme reckless-
ness or foolhardiness." BiAcK's LAw DiCTioNARY 1582 (6th ed. 1990).
27. KEEToN Err AL., supra note 13, § 60, at 412.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 413.
30. Id. at 418. Examples of dangers that would require warning are the in-
stallation of concealed high tension wires, and a concealed man-made trench. Id.
at 418 & nn. 83-84 (citations omitted). See also Haffey v. Lemieux, 224 A.2d 551,
553 (Conn. 1966) (finding that landowner should have told licensee mail carrier of
unsafe porch step, since it was foreseeable that licensee would climb porch steps to
deliver mail).




tential as well as actual danger.3 2 The theory on which this lia-
bility is based, often called the "economic benefit theory,"3 is
the proposition that "the duty of affirmative care to make the
premises safe is imposed upon the person in possession as the
price he must pay for the economic benefit he derives, or expects
to derive from the presence of the visitor."34 But the potential of
benefit to the owner is not enough to classify the visitor as an
invitee; there must also exist the element of invitation.35 With-
out the element of invitation, the intruder is a licensee or a tres-
passer, depending on the circumstances. 36
B. The Development of Public Outdoor Recreation
The post Civil War era commenced a period of public sup-
port for outdoor recreation, 37 during which time city,38 state,39
and national parks4° were established. Then, in 1916, the Na-
tional Park Service ("NPS") was created.41 It was directed by
the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916 to:
"promote" the use of the national parks, while declaring the "fun-
damental purpose" of the parks to be to "conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations."42
The NPS administers the national parks, national monuments
and military parks, including former Civil War battlefields. 43
The NPS also acquired the administrative functions of the for-
32. Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 612 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Conn.
1992).
33. RESTATEMENT (FuRsr) OF ToRrs §§ 332, 343 cmt. a (1934).
34. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 61, at 420.
35. See id. at 420-23.
36. Id. at 423.
37. CAMPBELL-MoHN ET AL., supra note 1, § 5.1(B)(2), at 205.
38. Id. (noting that Central Park in New York City was laid out in the 1860s).
39. Id. (noting that Niagara Falls and Adirondack State Parks were estab-
lished in 1885 by New York City residents who had the concern for and interest in
outdoor recreation).
40. Id. (noting that the first National Park, Yellowstone, was established by
Congress in 1872).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
42. CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., supra note 1, § 5.1(BX1), at 203.
43. Id. §§ 5.1(B)(2)-(3), at 205-08.
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mer Bureau of Outdoor Recreation" which had been estab-
lished in 1963 to encourage recreation at all levels: federal,
state, and local. 45 Congressional recreation legislation included
the national system of trails established in 1968,46 and the crea-
tion of more urban parks, national historic sites, and national
recreation areas in the 1970s through the 1990s. 47 Recreation
legislation "reflects the recognition of the increasing importance
of public recreational resources in a post-industrial, populous
country."48
The federal government acquires land for recreation by
purchase and by condemnation.49 State and local ownership of
recreational land has also been established by gift, purchase or
condemnation.50 Economic difficulties, however, including ris-
ing land prices and sinking state budgets, 51 have slowed down
the acquisition of land for recreation at the state and local level.
Governmental bodies became more dependent on donations in
order to obtain land to use for recreation. 52 This led to the de-
velopment of recreational use statutes.
44. Id. § 5.1(B)(3), at 210 n.38.
45. 16 U.S.C. § 4601 (1988). Specifically, Congress stated that:
The Congress finds and declares it to be desirable that all American
people of present and future generations be assured adequate outdoor recre-
ation resources, and that it is desirable for all levels of government and pri-
vate interests to take prompt and coordinated action to the extent
practicable without diminishing or affecting their respective powers and
functions to conserve, develop, and utilize such resources for the benefit and
enjoyment of the American people.
Id.




49. Id. § 5.2(A)(1), at 220. The terms of purchase and source of funds are de-
tailed in 16 U.S.C. § 4601-5(a) (1988). Id. at 220-21. For Congress' declaration of
the purpose of the Act, see supra note 45.
50. CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., supra note 1, § 5.2(A)(2), at 222-31. Under the
Recreation and Public Purposes Act of 1926 (as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 869 to 869-
4 (1988)), federal land can be conveyed to a state or locality for "'historic-monu-
ment purposes or recreational purposes'" at no charge. Id. § 5.2(A)(2), at 223
(quoting 43 U.S.C. § 869-1 (1988)). Gifts have established state parks (Yosemite
was given to the state of California by Congress in 1864) and others have been
purchased from private owners. Id. § 5.2(A)(3), at 231.
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C. Origin and Development of Recreational Use Statutes
The demand for recreational land has continued to outpace
the funds available for acquisition. 53 Since governmental funds
were inadequate to buy sufficient land, alternative approaches
to the situation were needed. One such alternative was to en-
courage private landowners to open up their land for public rec-
reation and use.54 This alternative was eventually adopted in
1965 by the Council of State Governments 55 as a strategy to
cope with the existing dilemma.56 The Council drafted a docu-
ment known as its Suggested State Legislation, which recom-
mended that the state legislatures pass "an act to encourage
landowners to make land and water areas available to the pub-
lic by limiting liability in connection therewith."57 The Council's
document, known as the Model Act of 1965, helped to make the
option of opening private land for public recreational use more
viable.58 The Act was subsequently adopted by several states,
53. Ford, supra note 2, at 171. The President's Commission on Americans
Outdoors conducted a workshop in 1986 studying "Recreation on Private Lands"
and discovered that the projections made in 1962 concerning the public's need for
recreational land in 2000 had already been reached in 1980 and the Commission
predicted that the need for more lands and waters for recreational activities will
increase. Id.
54. N. Linda Goldstein et al., Recreational Use Statutes-Tme For Reform,
PROB. & PROP., July-Aug. 1989, at 6, 7-10.
55. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OFFICIAL DIRECTORY
39-41 (1984).
The membership of the Council of State Governments ("CSG") includes the
states of the United States, the District of Columbia, and territories of the United
States. Its purpose, inter alia, is "to strengthen state government and preserve its
role in the American federal system by... assisting the states in improving their
legislative, administrative and judicial practices... (and] ... defining and coordi-
nating national programs." Id. The CSG conducts research on state programs and
problems and produces a number of publications including Suggested State Legis-
lation, which is published annually. The governing board of the CSG is composed
of: the governor of each state; two legislators from each state, one from each house;
and a large executive committee comprised of legislators, governors, a chief justice
and others. Id.
56. 1965 MODEL ACT, supra note 5, at 150-52.
57. Id. at 150.
58. John C. Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for Personal Injuries and
Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective is the Protection?, 24 IND. L. REv. 1587,
1590-91 (1991). Becker explains that:
The stated purpose of the 1965 Model Act was to encourage owners to
make land and water areas available to the public for recreational purposes
by limiting owner's liability toward persons who enter their property for
such purposes. Protection from liability was extended to holders of a fee
9
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including Connecticut. 59 The current Connecticut Recreational
Use Act, passed in 1971, 6o is in keeping with the purpose and
design of the original 1965 Model Act.61
ownership interest, as well as to tenants, lessees, occupants, and persons in
control of premises. The Act benefitted roads, waters, watercourses, private
ways and buildings, structures, and machinery or equipment attached to
realty.
Recreational activities within the purview of the 1965 Model Act in-
clude hunting, fishing, swimming, boating, camping, picnicking, hiking,
pleasure driving, nature study, water skiing, water sports, and viewing or
enjoying historical, archeological, scenic, or scientific sites. In describing
the protection afforded owners and occupiers, the Act states that an owner
or occupier owes no duty of care to keep premises safe for entry or use by
others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of dangerous condi-
tions, uses, structures, or activities to persons entering the premises for
such recreational purposes. If an owner directly or indirectly invites or per-
mits any person to use the property for recreational purposes without
charge, the owner does not assure that the premises are safe for any pur-
pose, nor confer the status of licensee or invitee on the person using the
property, nor assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to
persons or property caused by any act or omission of persons on the
property.
Id.
59. Scrapchansky v. Plainfield, 627 A.2d 1329, 1337-38 (Conn. 1993) (Katz, J.,
dissenting) ("Parroting a Model Act promulgated in 1965 by the Council of State
Governments, the Connecticut Legislature enacted General Statutes §§ 23-27a
through 23-27k, entitled 'An Act Limiting the Liability of Property Owners Toward
Persons Using Their Land for Recreation,' in 1967.").
60. 1971 Conn. Pub. Acts 249 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557g
(West 1991)). This section states that:
(a) Except as provided in section 52-557h, an owner of land who makes all or
any part of the land available to the public without charge, rent, fee or other
commercial service for recreational purposes owes no duty of care to keep
the land, or the part thereof so made available, safe for entry or use by
others for recreational purposes, or to give any warning of a dangerous con-
dition, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering for recrea-
tional purposes.
Id. (emphasis added). See also 1965 MODEL ACT, supra note 5, at 150. Addition-
ally, liability is imposed under certain conditions:
(1) For wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous con-
dition, use, structure or activity; (2) for injury suffered in any case where the
owner of land charges the person or persons who enter or go on the land for
the recreational use thereof, except that, in the case of land leased to the
state or a subdivision thereof, any consideration received by the owner for
the lease shall not be deemed a charge within the meaning of this section.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557h (West 1991). See also 1965 MODEL AcT, supra
note 5, at 150.




While it is true that the recreational use statute gives the
landowner a defense against liability barring wilful, reckless or
grossly negligent conduct, landowners "cannot simply declare
themselves covered by a recreational use statute and automati-
cally expect limited liability for all accidents occurring on their
property."62 There is no quid pro quo. Instead, in order to take
advantage of the statutory immunity from liability, landowners
must be sued before they can assert recreational use as an af-
firmative defense. They cannot prevent the bringing of a
lawsuit.
In 1979, the National Association of Conservation Districts
initiated a study of landowner liability and trespass laws.0 The
results of this study illuminated the fact that, despite the pro-
tection offered by recreational use statutes, landowners were
still concerned with potential liability. The study also noted:
[The] 1979 study of landowner liability and trespass laws noted
two deficiencies: (1) Liability law is generally too protective of
users, and injured persons have been granted recoveries so often
that landowners are discouraged from opening their land for rec-
reational use; and (2) both laws are too complex and confusing to
be either predictable or understood. As a result, landowners are
reluctant to make their land available, and the public has fewer
recreational choices. 64
The results of the study culminated in the 1979 Model Act.65
One essential difference between the 1965 Model Act and
the 1979 Model Act is that in the 1965 Act, "owner" is defined as
any "possessor of a fee interest, a tenant, lessee, occupant or
person in control of the premises,"66 whereas in the 1979 Model
Act, "owner" is defined as including any "individual, legal entity
or governmental agency that has any ownership or security in-
terest whatever or lease or right of possession in land."67 The
62. Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 8.
63. Becker, supra note 58, at 1590 (citing W.L. CHURCH, PRIVATE LANDS AND
PULIC RECREATION: A REPORT AND PROPOSED NEW MODEL ACT ON ACCEsS, LIABI-
ITY, AND TRESPASs (1979)). Church, associate dean of the University of Wisconsin
Law School, led this study.
64. Id. at 1591-92.
65. COUNCIL OF STATE GovERmENTs, 1979 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION
107-112 (1978) [hereinafter 1979 MODEL ACT].
66. 1965 MODEL ACT, supra note 5, at 151; Becker, supra note 58, at 1590.
67. 1979 MODEL ACT, supra note 65, at 107 (emphasis added); see also Becker,




Connecticut Recreational Use Statute did not adopt the 1979
Model Act definitions, and did not include governmental agen-
cies in the definition of "owner." A governmental agency, how-
ever, may have its own immunity which is derivative of
sovereign immunity.
D. Sovereign Immunity
1. The Federal Government
Sovereign immunity was adopted by American judges from
England where the idea was held that "the king can do no
wrong,"68 and thus became part of the common law of the
United States.6 9 It means that the federal or state government
is subject to being sued only when it consents. The federal gov-
ernment has waived sovereign immunity in some circumstances
and is liable in tort, if at all, only under the Federal Tort Claims
Act ("FTCA").7° The government's liability under this statute is
"in the same manner and to the same'extent as a private indi-
vidual [would be] under [the same] circumstances."71 Liability
for recreational injuries on federal lands is also governed by the
FTCA.72 Under the FTCA, the government's liability is limited
to acts of negligence, and to wrongful acts and omissions. 73 Dis-
cretionary acts are expressly exempted from tort liability under
the FTCA.74 Thus, no liability may be based upon the exercise
68. Carolyn Birmingham, Sovereign Immunity in Connecticut: Survey and
Economic Analysis, 13 CONN. L. REv. 293, 293 (1981) ("A sovereign is a supreme
repository of power. Unless it consents to suit, a suit brought against it will be
dismissed for want ofjurisdiction. This jurisdictional prerogative is the essence of
the doctrine immunity.").
69. KEETON ET AL, supra note 13, § 131, at 1033.
70. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1988). See also WiLLLAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 636 (8th ed. 1988). The Federal Tort Claims Act was
enacted in 1946, providing the judicial remedy available to anyone who suffered
tortious injury which could be attributed to the United States Government. KEE-
TON ET AL., supra note 13, § 131, at 1034 & n.13.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988).
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1988).
73. CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., supra note 1, § 5.2(BX4), at 251.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 131,
at 1041-42. Cases that have been adjudicated as within the discretionary exemp-
tion include claims of recreational users on federal lands "killed by a grizzly, in-
jured on a rocky path, drowned, injured by a fall along a trail, injured by a fall from
an arch, injured at a waterfall, struck by lightning, injured in a motorcycle race,




or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretion-
ary function or duty on the part of a Federal governmental
agency or employee. 75 Discretionary activities encompass judg-




State immunity, as a general rule, is much like that of the
federal government.7 7 Unless a state waives some or all of its
immunity, it is afforded complete protection against tort liabil-
ity.78 This immunity is both substantive and procedural. When
procedural immunity is removed, one has the right to sue a
state in tort or otherwise. Procedural immunity can be abol-
ished by statutes enacted by the state's legislature. Even when
procedural immunity is waived, however, a state can retain
substantive immunity as a defense against liability.79 Thus, a
statute may give consent for a state to be sued,80 but a state
court may hold that the statute did not also give the state's con-
sent to liability.8' Although the state has procedurally waived
immunity from liability, therefore, it does not necessarily follow
at 251-52 (footnotes and citations omitted). Cases with fact situations that were
not considered discretionary exemptions from liability are
claims by a swimmer attacked by an alligator at a swimming area in a na-
tional forest, a swimmer killed by a powerboat at a recreational water pro-
ject, a diver paralyzed by hitting a submerged tree stump at a Corps of
Engineers project leased to a state park system, a diver paralyzed by hitting
a submerged rock adjacent to a national park, and beach visitors injured by
hot coals on the beach.
Id. at 252 (footnotes and citations omitted).
75. See generally CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., supra note 1, § 5.2(B)(4), at 251-52.
See also Gordon v. Bridgeport Hous. Auth., 544 A.2d 1158, 1188 (Conn. 1988).
76. CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., supra note 1, § 5.2(B)(4), at 252. Discretionary
functions are generally contrasted with operational ones. The planning stage is
usually discretionary, whereas the implementation of the plan is usually held to be
operational. Id.
77. KEETON Er AL., supra note 13, § 131, at 1043.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1043 & n.16.
80. For example, the state of New York has constitutionally given jurisdiction
to the Court of Claims to hear cases against the state. N.Y. CT. CLAIMs ACT § 8
(McKinney 1989) ("The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action
and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined ...
81. GEORGE F. KUGLER, JR., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE
ON SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 134 (1972).
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that the state has waived completely all immunity from sub-
stantive liability. The nature of the activity implicated in the
suit, as well as the particular governmental agency involved,
are essential factors in determining whether or not the state or
its agents will claim substantive tort immunity.8 2
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion,83 however, does provide procedural immunity in that it
bars suits against state governments in federal courts.84 Any
suits against the state based on federal law must be initially
brought in state rather than in federal court.8 5
The majority of states have consented to some tort liability,
and the extent of liability accepted and the reasons for accept-
ance differ among the states.8 6 A study of tort liability in the
states, concerning state reluctance to give up complete immu-
nity and varying degrees of abrogation of immunity, indicated
that three factors contributed to this reluctance:
(1)... cumbrous language about sovereignty and the nature of law
which is usually contradictory within itself... (2) Legislative and
judicial inertia ... and (3) financial fears, that the states and their
subdivisions actually cannot afford, in the face of other more ur-
82. Id. at 140. See also PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 206-07 (1983);
HARRY STREET, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILrrY 143-84 (1975). See also McCummings v.
New York City Transit Auth., 81 N.Y.2d 923, 932, 613 N.E.2d 559, 564, 597
N.Y.S.2d 653, 658 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 548 (1993)
("'Nothing in the legislative history of the Court of Claims Act... indicates that
the waiver provision was designed to override the well-defined and carefully rea-
soned body of law .... The city's defense which we here sustain rests not on any
anachronistic concept of sovereignty, but rather on a regard for sound principles of
government administration and a respect for the expert judgment of agencies au-
thorized by law to exercise such judgment.'" (quoting Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579,
588, 167 N.E.2d 63, 67, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (1960))); McCabe v. New Jersey
Turnpike Auth., 170 A.2d 810,813 (N.J. 1961) ("[T]he majority of courts have been
reluctant to construe consent provisions as authorizing liability for ordinary negli-
gence unless the statute clearly so states."); Maynard v. City of New London, No.
525277, 1995 WL 55113, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1995) (Connecticut Gen-
eral Statutes § 7-465 "expressly denies the governmental immunity defense.").
83. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
84. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 131, at 1043.
85. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.11, at
47 (4th ed. 1991).
86. For a list of the distinctions between states, see KEETON ET AL., supra note




gent demands upon their treasuries, to pay out what they would
be required to pay if tort liability were accepted.87
3. Municipalities
A municipality is "a legally incorporated or duly authorized
association of inhabitants of limited area for local governmental
or other public purposes."88 Municipal corporations are created
by and derive their powers from the state's legislature.89 They
are subdivisions of the state, acting as local governments, and
also have the same interests as private corporations. 90 At com-
mon law municipalities enjoyed governmental immunity in tort
claims that arose from governmental activities, but not those
that arose out of proprietary or ministerial activities of the gov-
ernment.91 "'Governmental acts are performed wholly for the
direct benefit of the public and are supervisory or discretionary
in nature.... On the other hand, ministerial acts are performed
in a prescribed manner, without the exercise of judgment or dis-
cretion .. ,"92 Police and fire departments, for example, are
considered governmental, having been endowed with power by
the government, and are immune from suit for tortious acts.93
On the other hand, municipal corporations performing proprie-
tary functions are not offered immunity.94 In addition, other
municipal corporations, such as public hospitals and munici-
pally-owned utility companies, which usually charge for their
services and are operated like private corporations, are not
granted immunity from liability for their tortious acts.95 The
American Law Institute recognizes as a general rule that mu-
nicipalities have no general immunity.96 Discretionary func-
tions, however, still remain as a shield against municipal
87. Robert A. Leflar & Benjamin E. Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1954).
88. BLAcis LAW DICmONARY 1018 (6th ed. 1990).
89. See id. at 1017.
90. PROSSER ET AL., supra note 70, at 625.
91. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 131, at 1051-53.
92. Kolanizk v. Board of Educ., 610 A.2d 193, 195 (Conn. 1992) (quoting
Heighl v. Board of Educ., 587 A.2d 423, 425 (Conn. 1991) (quoting Gauvin v. New
Haven, 445 A.2d 1, 3 (Conn. 1982))).
93. KEETON ET AL., supra note 13, § 131, at 1053.
94. Id. at 1051.
95. Id. at 1053.




liability in all states including those that have generally abol-
ished immunity, those that retain immunity subject to excep-
tions, and those that retain municipal immunity and extend it
even to other entities such as school districts and counties. 97
III. Current State of the Law
A. Connecticut's State Immunity
"That a sovereign state is immune from suit, unless it con-
sents to be sued is the settled law of Connecticut."98 The state's
right not to be sued is not to be diminished by statute unless a
clear intention to that effect is expressed by the legislature. 99
There are exceptions, however, to the general rule that there is
no suit without consent.100 First, the Connecticut Constitu-
tion 01 has authorized the legislature to provide statutorily for a
claims commissioner who hears claims against the state.10 2 The
commissioner's decision is final on questions of law and fact, l03
but judicial review is possible under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, once all administrative remedies have been ex-
hausted.10 4 Second, Connecticut has statutorily consented to
suit in certain situations such as actions against the state on
97. Id. at 1053 (citations omitted).
98. Murphy v. Ives, 196 A.2d 596, 598 (Conn. 1963) (citing State v. Kilburn,
69 A. 1028, 1029 (Conn. 1908)).
99. Murphy, 196 A.2d at 598 (quoting Kilburn, 69 A. at 1029).
100. Birmingham, supra note 68, at 296.
101. Id. (citing CoN. CONST. art. XI, § 4 ("Claims against the state shall be
resolved in such a manner as may be provided by law.")).
102. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-160(a) (West 1991). This section states that
"[w]hen the claims commissioner deems it just and equitable, he may authorize
suit against the state on any claim which, in his opinion, presents an issue of law
or fact under which the state, were it a private person, could be liable." Id. CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-142 (West 1991) states that:
There shall be a claims commissioner who shall hear and determine all
claims against the state except: (1) Claims for disability, pension, retire-
ment, employment benefits; (2) the periodic payment of claims upon which
suit otherwise is authorized by law; (3) claims for which an administrative
hearing procedure otherwise is established by law; (4) requests by political
subdivisions of the state for the payment of grants in lieu of taxes, and (5)
claims for the refund of taxes.
Id.
103. Birmingham, supra note 68, at 297-98. "Although the claims commis-
sioner can grant permission to sue the state or one of its agencies, he rarely does
so." Id. at 299.
104. Id. at 298.
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highway and public works contracts,10 5 and injuries sustained
on state highways or sidewalks.106
In Connecticut, "a municipality has governmental immu-
nity in the performance of its governmental discretionary func-
tions,"10 7 but not its ministerial ones. Thus, there is no
immunity for ministerial acts whereby a duty is to be performed
in a prescribed manner, but there is immunity when the act re-
quires the exercise of judgment or discretion.108 Exceptions to
discretionary immunity occur where (1) a statute specifically
abolishes municipal immunity,109 (2) a statute imposes deriva-
tive liability on municipalities for certain tortious conduct of
municipal employees,110 and (3) the statute imposes liability on
a municipality for the negligence of its employees acting within
the scope of their employment."1
105. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-61(a) (West 1991).
106. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-144 (West 1991).
107. Letowt v. City of Norwalk, 579 A.2d 601, 601 (Conn. 1989).
108. Gordon v. Bridgeport Hous. Auth., 544 A.2d 1185, 1189 (Conn. 1988)
(reasoning that discretionary acts are an exception to liability, given that such acts
are not performed maliciously, wantonly or in an abuse of discretion). The court
held that:
"A municipality is immune from liability for the performance of governmen-
tal acts as distinguished from ministerial acts. Governmental acts are per-
formed wholly for the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory or
discretionary in nature.... On the other hand, ministerial acts are per-
formed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discre-
tion as to the propriety of the action."
Id. (quoting Gauvin v. New Haven, 445 A-2d 1, 3 (Conn. 1982) (citing Tango v. New
Haven, 377 A.2d 284, 285 (Conn. 1977); Wright v. Brown, 356 A.2d 176, 180 (Conn.
1975)). See also Maynard v. New London, No. 525277, 1995 WL 55113 at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1995); Gaylor v. Town of West of Hartford, No. 39 13 74, 1994
WL 228349 at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 9, 1994); and Pfeifer v. Holman, No. 50 30
38, 1990 WL 288660 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 2, 1990).
109. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-108 (West 1991). This section states that cit-
ies or boroughs are liable for damage from mobs. Id.
110. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-465 (West 1991). There is an assumption of
liability for damage caused by employees or members of local emergency planning
districts, and joint liability of municipalities with district departments of health or
regional planning agencies.
111. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557n (West 1991 & Supp. 1994). This stat-
ute details the liability of municipal corporations. The only mention of a recrea-
tional area is in section (b)(4) in which the access to a recreational area is
discussed. The statute in whole states that:
(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the
state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The
negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee,
17
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officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official
duties; (B) negligence in the performance of functions from which the polit-
ical subdivision derives a special corporate profit or pecuniary benefit; and
(C) acts of the political subdivision which constitute the creation or partici-
pation in the creation of a nuisance; provided, no cause of action shall be
maintained for damages resulting from injury to any person or property by
the means of a defective road or bridge except pursuant to section 13a-149.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state
shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts or
omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal con-
duct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or omis-
sions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official
function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, a
political subdivision of the state or any employee, officer or agent acting
within the scope of his employment or official duties shall not be liable for
damages to person or property resulting from: (1) The condition of natural
land or unimproved property; (2) the condition of a reservoir, dam, canal,
conduit, drain or similar structure when used by a person in a manner
which is not reasonably foreseeable; (3) the temporary condition of a road or
bridge which results from weather, if the political subdivision has not re-
ceived notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the condi-
tion safe; (4) the condition of an unpaved road, trail or footpath, the purpose
of which is to provide access to a recreational or scenic area, if the political
subdivision has not received notice and has not had a reasonable opportu-
nity to make the condition safe; (5) the initiation of a judicial or administra-
tive proceeding, provided that such action is not determined to have been
commenced or prosecuted without probable cause or with a malicious intent
to vex or trouble, as provided in section 52-568; (6) the act or omission of
someone other than an employee, officer or agent of the political subdivision;
(7) the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure or refusal to
issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, or-
der or similar authorization, when such authority is a discretionary function
by law, unless such issuance, denial, suspension or revocation or such fail-
ure or refusal constitutes a reckless disregard for health or safety; (8) failure
to make an inspection or making an inadequate or negligent inspection of
any property, other than property owned or leased by or leased to such polit-
ical subdivision, to determine whether the property complies with or vio-
lates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety, unless the political
subdivision had notice of such a violation of law or such a hazard or unless
such failure to inspect or such inadequate or negligent inspection consti-
tutes a reckless disregard for health or safety under all the relevant circum-
stances; (9) failure to detect or prevent pollution of the environment,
including groundwater, watercourses and wells, by individuals or entities
other than the political subdivision; or (10) conditions on land sold or trans-
ferred to the political subdivision by the state when such conditions existed
at the time the land was sold or transferred to the political subdivision.
(c) Any person who serves as a member of any board, commission, com-
mittee or agency of a municipality and who is not compensated for such
membership on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall not be personally
liable for damage or injury occurring on or after October 1, 1992, resulting
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss3/6
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B. Immunity under the Connecticut Recreational Use
Statutes
1. Grant of Immunity to Private Landowners
According to Genco v. Connecticut Light and Power Co.,112
"limiting [a] private property owner's liability for injuries sus-
tained on his property to situations in which there has been wil-
ful or malicious failure to warn against dangerous conditions,"
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Consti-
tution.11 3 Under an equal protection analysis, "[if the statute
does not touch upon either a fundamental right or a suspect
class, its classification need only be rationally related to some
legitimate government purpose in order to withstand an equal
protection challenge."114 In this situation, the legislative pur-
pose of the statute is to encourage private landowners to open
their land to the public for recreational needs.1 5 The court
found this purpose to be legitimate, and the means used-the
statutory limitation of liability-to be rationally related to this
purpose. 16 The court, therefore, found that the recreational use
statute withstood constitutional review." 7
The Connecticut Recreational statute has likewise been
found not to violate the Connecticut Constitution.18 The Con-
from any act, error or omission made in the exercise of such person's policy
or decision-making responsibilities on such board, commission, committee or
agency if such person was acting in good faith, and within the scope of such
person's official functions and duties, and was not acting in violation of any
state, municipal or professional code of ethics regulating the conduct of such
person, or in violation of subsection (a) of section 9-369b or subsection (b) or
(c) of section 1-21i. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply if such
damage or injury was caused by the reckless, wilful or wanton misconduct of
such person.
Id. (emphasis added).
112. 508 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1986).
113. Id. at 63 (citing Goodson v. Racine, 312 N.W.2d 16 (Wis. 1973)).
114. Genco, 508 A.2d at 62 (quoting Ryszkiewicz v. New Britain, 479 A.2d 793,
798 (Conn. 1984)).
115. Michael Y, Davis, Landowner Liability Under the Wyoming Recreational
Use Statute, 25 LAND & WATER L. Ray. 649, 651 (1980).
116. Genco, 508 A.2d at 62.
117. JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAw OF PREMISES LIABnLry § 5.23, at 126-27 (2nd
ed. 1988).
118. CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 10. This section states that "[a]ll courts shall be
open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shallhave remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial or delay." Id.
19
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necticut Constitution states that every person shall have a rem-
edy by due course of law for injury done to him. 119 The court
found that "it is within the province of the legislature to rede-
fine or abolish existing definitions of injury since it is within its
province to create, abrogate or redefine the 'established law,' "120
and that, therefore, Connecticut's Constitution has not been vi-
olated by the statute.
2. Grant of Immunity to Municipalities as Landowners
In Manning v. Barenz,'2 1 a landmark case, "owner" immu-
nity under the recreational use statute was extended to munici-
palities. 122 A two-year old child was injured when a metal box
containing toys fell on his hand while he was playing in a mu-
nicipal park.123 The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed a
lower court decision that the municipality was the "owner" of
land within the meaning of the recreational use statute. 124
Thus, it concluded, the municipality enjoyed the immunity from
liability that the statute conferred. 25
The court held that" '[w]here the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words them-
selves express the intent of the legislature and there is no need
for statutory construction or a review of the legislative his-
tory.'"' 126 The court focused on the definition of the word
"owner" in the recreational use statute, interpreting the term
unambiguously to mean "the possessor of a fee interest."127
Since the statute did not plainly say private landowners, the
court concluded that section 52-557g applied to all land own-
119. Id.
120. Gentile v. Altermatt, 363 A.2d 1, 11 (Conn. 1975); see also Genco, 508
A.2d at 63 ("A statute limiting the liability of owners who provide the public with
park area for outdoor recreational purposes is a reasonable exercise of legislative
power, and it does not violate the constitutional provision that the courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury.").
121. 603 A.2d 399 (Conn. 1992).
122. Id. at 402-03.
123. Id at 400.
124. Id. at 399.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 401 (quoting All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor
Control, 567 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Conn. 1989)).




ers-private and public, 12 and the court did not look to the leg-
islative purpose of the statute. Therefore, in order to fall within
the purview of the statute, a municipality needed only to estab-
lish that it was the possessor of a fee interest in land available
to the public without charge for recreational purposes. 129 The
court reasoned that its decision was in accord with a majority of
other jurisdictions that have considered the definition of
"owner" within similar recreational use statutes.1 30
Prior to the 1992 decision in Manning, the issue of govern-
mental immunity under the recreational use statute had been
addressed in the state's lower courts, but with varying results.
At the federal court level, however, Connecticut's Recreational
Use Statute was found to confer immunity from liability upon
the United States government. In Jennett v. United States,'31
Connecticut law was applied in a suit involving a wrongful
death action for a drowning which occurred on a reservoir in
Connecticut which was owned by the federal government, and
maintained by the Army Corps of Engineers. 32 The suit
against the United States was permitted under the Federal
Torts Claims Act.133 The district court held that Connecticut
Statutes section 52-557g' 34 applied in this case because the
landowner was the U.S. Government, and under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, the federal government is treated as a private
individual would be treated in the same circumstances.135
Under the FTCA, the United States Government is susceptible
to liability only if a private citizen would be liable under similar
circumstances, regardless of the state law being applied. 36
Therefore, if a private owner would be immune from liability
under the recreational use statute, the federal government and
its agencies would also be immune. 37 In Jennett, therefore, ap-
plicability of the statute made the government immune to liabil-
128. Manning, 603 A.2d at 401.
129. Id.
130. Id. n.4.
131. 597 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
132. Id. at 110.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1988). See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying
text.
134. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557g (West 1991).
135. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.




ity.138 The district court held that "[tihe principle of
encouraging landowners to open their land by limiting potential
tort liability applies with equal force to the Government as to
other landowners."13 9
At the state court level, decisions preceding Manning140 had
been divided over whether or not section 52-557g applied to
public landowners. 141 In July 1993, the Connecticut Supreme
Court reaffirmed the Manning rule in Scrapchansky v. Plain-
field.142 Scrapchansky involved a man who was injured while
playing in a baseball game on a field owned by the town of
Plainfield. 43 The lower court found that the municipality had
tort immunity, based on the court ruling in Manning.'" The
Supreme Court of Connecticut, in a three-two decision, affirmed
the lower court decision.' 45 "Our decision in Manning v. Barenz
... settled the question in Connecticut of whether the [Recrea-
tional Use] [Aict affords immunity from liability for negligence
or nuisance to a municipality for an injury suffered on town
land developed as a playground."146 Thus, the court found that
the act did confer immunity on municipal landowners. 4
7
The dissent in Scrapchansky, however, persuasively argued
against the majority's finding of governmental immunity' 48
The dissent stated that nothing in the legislative history sug-
gested that the legislature intended or even contemplated that
the act would provide immunity for governmental entities.
149
"Therefore," the dissent concluded, "to apply the act to munici-
palities imposes too high a societal cost and serves no useful or
intelligible purpose." 50
138. Jennett, 597 F. Supp. at 113.
139. Id. at 112.
140. Manning v. Barenz, 603 A.2d 399 (Conn. 1992).
141. See generally Gauthier v. Town of Fairfield, No. CIV 89-0261744-S, 1990
WL 271070 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 2, 1990).
142. 627 A.2d 1329, 1336 (Conn. 1993).
143. Id. at 1330.
144. Id. at 1330, 1332.
145. Id. at 1331.
146. Id. at 1336.
147. Id.
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3. Municipal Tort Immunity in New York
As discussed above, 151 when the defendant is the United
States government, under the Federal Torts Claims Act, the
federal government is susceptible to liability only if a private
citizen would be liable under similar circumstances, regardless
of what state law is being applied. 152 When the defendant is a
state or municipal corporation, however, the results have
varied.153
151. See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Robin C. Miller, Effect of Statute Limiting Landowner's Li-
ability for Personal Injury to Recreational User, 47 A.L.R. 4TH 262 (1986 & Supp.
1994). Several states have interpreted that recreational use statutes give munci-
palities immunity from liability.
For example, in Louisiana, the state is considered in the same position as a
private litigant, and thereby has immunity under its recreational use statute. Id.
at 275 (citing Rushing v. State, 381 So. 2d 1250 (La. Ct. App. 1980); Pratt v. State,
408 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1981)).
Similarly, in Michigan, the court applied its recreational use statute to munic-
ipalities, holding that there was no reason to distinguish between the state and
local government. Id. at 277 (citing McNeal v. Department of Natural Resources,
364 N.W.2d 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985)).
Also, in Nevada, the court held that the term "owner" was broad enough to
include a public owner and that there was nothing on the face of the statute which
indicated that the legislature intended to limit the statute to private owners. Id.
at 277 (citing Watson v. Omaha, 312 N.W.2d 256 (Neb. 1981)).
And, in Oregon, the court held that its recreational use statute applied to pub-
lic as well as to private: landowners. Id. at 278 (citing Hogg v. Clatstop County,
610 P.2d 1248 (Or. App. 1980)).
On the other hand, a Minnesota court, referring to the legislative purpose of a
now repealed statute, held that the term "owner" under its recreational use statute
did not extend to municipalities. Id. (citing Hovet v. Bagley, 325 N.W.2d 813
(Minn. 1982)).
Likewise, a Pennsylvania court held that the state was not an owner under
the recreational use statute because when the Pennsylvania statute was enacted
the state already possessed sovereign immunity to the type of action to which the
statute applied and, therefore, the legislature would not have believed the statute
was necessary to protect the state. Id. at 280 (citing Hahn v. Commonwealth, 18
Pa. D. & C.3d 260 (1980)).
And in Florida, a court held that the recreational use statute should not be
interpreted as extending liability protection to governmental entities because gov-
ernment is already charged with making the land available to the public and the
statute is directed towards private landowners to motivate and encourage them to
open up their private lands to the public. Id. at 280 (citing Pensacola v. Stain, 448
So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
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For example, the New York Court of Appeals in Sega v.
State154 held that New York's recreational use statute 55 did not
limit the scope of the term "owner" to private landowners.156 In
Sega, two claimants were injured while on state lands. 57 The
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the legislature in-
tended that the statute apply only to private landowners.5 8 In
its reasoning, it found that the statutory language in the stat-
ute was unambiguous, 59 and that "[i]nasmuch as the legislative
intent is apparent from the language of [the statute], there is no
occasion to consider the import, if any, of the legislative
memorandum."160
In Ferres v. New Rochelle,' 6' however, the Court of Appeals
denied immunity under the statute to a municipality. 6 2 In con-
trast to the court in Sega, the court examined the legislative
history of the statute, stating that its purpose was to encourage
landowners to allow their properties to be used by the public. 63
The court held that
[Ut would be contrary to reason to assume that the Legislature
could have intended that the statute apply in circumstances
where neither the basic purpose of the statute, nor, indeed, any
purpose could be served-as in the case of the supervised park
here where the municipality has already held its recreational fa-
cility open to the public and needs no encouragement to do so from
the prospective immunity offered by the statute.16 4
The court then distinguished Sega, reasoning that the question
of whether section 9-103 applied to this kind of municipal park
154. 60 N.Y.2d 183, 456 N.E.2d 1174, 469 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1983).
155. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney 1989). Section 9-103
originated as § 370 of the Conservation Law, originally passed in 1956. Act of
April 19, 1956, ch. 842, 1956 N.Y. Laws 1113. Thus, the section was not based on
either the 1965 or the 1979 Model Acts.
156. Sega, 60 N.Y.2d at 190, 456 N.E.2d at 1177, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
157. Id. at 188, 189, 456 N.E.2d at 1176, 1177, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 53, 54. Sega is
a consolidation of two cases: Sega v. State, 89 A.D.2d 412, 456 N.Y.S.2d 856 (3d
Dep't 1982); and Cutway v. State, 89 A.D.2d 406, 456 N.Y.S.2d 539 (3d Dep't 1982).
158. Id. at 190-91, 456 N.E.2d at 1177-78, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 54-55.
159. Id. at 190, 456 N.E.2d at 1177, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
160. Id. at 191, 456 N.E.2d at 1178, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 55.
161. 68 N.Y.2d 446, 502 N.E.2d 972, 510 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1986).
162. Id. at 449, 502 N.E.2d at 974, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
163. Id. at 452-55, 502 N.E.2d at 975-77, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 61-62.




was "not clearly answered by the words of the statute .. .. "165
The court, after analyzing the legislative history, held that sec-
tion 9-103 did not apply in this case. 166
Thus, in Sega the New York Court of Appeals has extended
the definition of the term "owner" in its recreational use statute
to include public or municipal landowners. 167 But in Ferres, the
Court of Appeals, in denying municipal liability, demonstrated
a willingness to consider the legislative history to determine the
proper reach of the statute.168
IV. Analysis
A. Private Landowners Who Allow Public Use of Their Land
Fulfill An Important Societal Need
Most states have enacted recreational use statutes1 69 whose
purpose has been to make more land available to the public for
recreation. 170 National emphasis on health and exercise and an
ever increasing population have created a need for more recrea-
tional land. Increased financial burdens on the states make it
difficult for the states themselves to purchase recreational land.
Thus, legislatures have encouraged private landowners to allow
public use of their land for recreation. 71 The Connecticut Rec-
reational Use Statute sought to encourage private landowners
to open their lands to public recreation by granting them immu-
nity from tort liability.1 72 The government alone cannot meet
the public's need for recreational and open space. 173
"[W]e have long depended and will continue to depend upon the
generosity of private owners of land and water to open up their
property to the use and enjoyment of their fellow citizens .... So
165. Id. at 456, 502 N.E.2d at 977, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 63.
166. Id. at 453, 502 N.E.2d at 976, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
167. Sega, 60 N.Y.2d at 190, 456 N.E.2d at 1177, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
168. Ferres, 68 N.Y.2d at 452-55, 502 N.E.2d at 975-77, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 61-
62.
169. See supra notes 3-4, 10 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.




this act here is to allow limited liability... of Connecticut prop-
erty owners to open their land for public use without charge."174
Landowners could not be expected to open their lands and then
be liable for injuries that occurred to anyone coming on their
land. Unless private landowners are given statutory protection,
recreational users of these private lands would be owed a duty
of care normally given to licensees who come on the land. That
is, landowners would have to use reasonable care to give notice
of potential dangers and be responsible for a user's injuries
where such notice was lacking. The burden of this obligation on
land covering many acres would be monumental. The recrea-
tional use statutes, however, by limiting an owner's liability to
wilful or wanton conduct, instead imposes upon the landowner
a duty of due care as if the user were a trespasser, not a licen-
see. 175 A landowner is not responsible for injuries to trespassers
caused by an unsafe condition of the land. Therefore, the recre-
ational user of private land, like the trespasser, comes on the
land at his or her own risk. There is, however, always the ex-
ception for wilful or wanton conduct or neglect which would
make a private landowner liable for injuries sustained by a tres-
passer or recreational user. The limitation on liability is in
keeping with the purpose of recreational use statutes: to make
available more recreational land, and thereby satisfy the de-
mands of society and alleviate the burden on the states of
purchasing this recreational land. Landowners, then, should be
encouraged to open their lands for public use, and may need
even more incentives than afforded to them under the recrea-
tional use statutes. Even when the private owner has immu-
nity from liability, he may still be sued and have to go to court
to assert an affirmative defense of immunity from liability
under the statute, which will cost the owner litigation fees and
court costs.
17 6
Elimination of potential litigation might be accomplished
by registration of the offered land with the state, and the post-
ing of notice to the recreational user that the land is to be used
174. Id. (quoting 13 CoNNEcricuT GENERAL ASSEMBLY PROC., 1971 Sess., Pt.
4, at 1805 (remarks of Rep. David Lavine)).
175. See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
176. See Neri v. Woodbury, 3 Conn. L. Rptr. 213,214 (1991) (raising an unsuc-




at the user's risk. The state might also consider tax incentives,
such as a reduction of property taxes to those who register their
property with the state, specifying that their land is open to the
public for certain recreational uses.177
B. Public Landowners Should Not Be Extended Immunity
From Liability Under the Connecticut Recreational
Use Statute
The immunity given by a recreational use statute to a pri-
vate landowner derogates 178 the common law because it reduces
the duty of care owed to one who is invited onto private land.
The landowner now owes a duty of due care to the recreational
user equivalent to that owed to a trespasser. Under the canons
of statutory construction, a statute which derogates the com-
mon law must be strictly construed in accord with its pur-
pose.1 79 The Connecticut Recreational Use Statute does not
specifically state whether the term "owner" in the statute in-
cludes both private landowners and governmental entities, such
as municipalities.8 0 The legislative purpose in Connecticut,
however, was to encourage private landowners to give free ac-
cess to their lands in exchange for limited liability, in order to
meet the demand for recreational land.' 81 The legislature never
mentioned, and probably never considered, extending limited li-
ability to public landowners, such as municipalities, when it
passed the recreational use statute.18 2 Since the statute should
be strictly construed in accord with its purpose of limiting liabil-
ity to private landowners, it is not correct to extend immunity
under the statute to "public owners." 8 3
Connecticut's Supreme Court, however, has extended im-
munity under the recreational use statute to municipalities in
177. Goldstein et al., supra note 54, at 10.
178. Derogation is defined as "the partial repeal or abolishing of a law, as by a
subsequent act which limits its scope or impairs its utility and force." BLAcies LAw
DICTIONARY 444 (6th ed. 1990).
179. Scrapchansky, 627 A.2d at 1340 & n.6 (Katz, J., dissenting).
180. See id. at 1336-37.
181. Id. at 1339.
182. Id. at 1340. The 1979 Model Act, in contrast to the 1965 Model Act that
the Connecticut Legislature used as a model for its recreational use statute, specif-
ically included governmental entities. See supra text accompanying note 67.




its Manning'" decision, and reaffirmed this decision in
Scrapchansky.85 In Scrapchansky, the court pointed out that
the decision to apply immunity to municipalities "is not incon-
sistent with many state courts that have applied their recrea-
tional use acts to public owners." 18 6 It is not meaningful,
however, to compare jurisdictions abstractly, because there are
too many factors that vary from one state to the next. First, it
must be determined if a particular state's recreational use stat-
ute was based on the 1965 Model Act, the 1979 Model Act or
neither, because this may affect the purpose of the statute.18 7
Connecticut based its recreational use statute on the 1965
Model Act, which did not include governmental entities in the
definition of owner. This stands in contrast to other states
which based their statutes on the 1979 Model Act, which specifi-
cally included governmental entities under its immunity um-
brella. 88 States which applied the 1979 Model Act, therefore,
were clearly given a legislative mandate to extend immunity to
municipalities. No such mandate exists for states such as Con-
necticut, whose recreational use statutes are based on the 1965
Model Act, and whose statutes have not been subsequently
amended to reflect any change from the original purpose of the
Act.
The court in Manning,8 9 however, stated that when the
plain meaning of a statute is completely unambiguous, the
analysis stops at that point.19 ° "'Where the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous, it is assumed that the words
themselves express the intent of the legislature and there is no
need for statutory construction or a review of the legislative his-
184. Id. at 1336 (citing Manning v. Barenz, 603 A.2d 399 (Conn. 1992)).
185. Id.
186. Id. n.8 (citing Manning v. Barenz, 603 A.2d 399 (Conn. 1992)).
187. New York's recreational use statute, for example, was originally passed
in 1956 as part of the state's Conservation Law. See supra note 155. However, the
purpose behind the statute is similar to the purpose of the 1965 Model Act and the
Connecticut recreational use statute: to encourage landowners to allow use of
their land for recreational users. See Ferres, 68 N.Y.2d at 454, 502 N.E.2d at 977,
510 N.Y.S.2d at 61-62.
188. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
189. Manning v. Barenz, 603 A.2d 399 (Conn. 1992).
190. Id. at 401.
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tory.'" 191 The court concluded that since the definition of
"owner" includes the "possessor of a fee interest," a municipality
which possesses a fee interest is also an owner, and, therefore,
the Connecticut Recreational Land Use Statute 92 "applies to all
land owners-municipal and private."193
The term "owner," although unambiguous, however, must
be considered in its context.' 9 ' The Connecticut statute, at its
enactment in 1971, was based on the 1965 Model Act, which did
not include a governmental entity in the definition of "owner."
The legislature never amended the statute to indicate that it
intended to include public landowners in the term "owner."195
The legislative purpose to address private landowners was
never amended. A statute which derogates the common law
must be strictly construed in accord with its purpose, which re-
quires an examination of the relevant legislative history of the
statute. 196 Therefore, the term "owner" should not be construed
to include public landowners.
191. Id. (quoting All Brand Importers, Inc. v. Department of Liquor Control,
567 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Conn. 1989)).
192. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557g (West 1991).
193. Manning, 603 A.2d at 401.
194. Steven D. Ecker, The Recreational Use Statute Takes on a Whole New
Meaning: Is There Life After Manning v. Barenz and Scrapchansky v. Plainield?,
CTLA FoRuM/CoNN. TRIAL LAw. ASS'N, Nov. 5, 1993, at 33.
195. The court in Manning further stated that it would have arrived at the
same conclusion even if it consulted the legislative history because the legislative
purpose of opening lands for public use was "not thwarted" by extending the immu-
nity to public lands as well. Manning, 603 A.2d at 401 n.3. This is not sound
reasoning because it puts in a factor that was never mentioned (nor considered) by
the legislature. The author submits that there is no justification for a court to give
immunity to a municipality under a statute when the thought never entered the
mind of the legislators.
196. For example, the New York Court of Appeals in Ferres, in determining
whether New York's recreational use statute should apply to a municipal land-
owner which already operated a recreational area, examined the legislative his-
tory. Ferres, 68 N.Y.2d at 452-55, 502 N.E.2d at 975-77, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 60-62.
The court stated:
[W]e must, of course, carefully examine the language of the statute and its
underlying purpose to determine its intended effect. But we may also look
beyond the words of the statute, to the history surrounding its original en-
actment .... We are mindful that in "the interpretation of statutes, the
spirit and purpose of the act and the objects to be accomplished must be
considered. The legislative intent is the great and controlling principle."
Id. at 451,502 N.E.2d at 975,510 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (quoting People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y.
149, 152, 8 N.E.2d 313, 315 (1937) (citations omitted)).
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Second, the issue of state sovereignty must be considered.
The fact that states do not all exercise the same amount of sov-
ereign immunity, at their own option, makes it meaningless to
compare jurisdictions as a basis for statutory interpretation.
Connecticut has never totally abrogated 197 its immunity, and
has steadfastly held to the doctrine that the sovereign is im-
mune from suit unless it consents. 198 When the recreational use
statute was passed in 1971, the state still enjoyed substantial
immunity. Although bills were proposed in the Connecticut
General Assembly to waive some or all of the immunity of the
state,199 "[o]bjections to waiver of immunity focused on in-
creased cost to the state through increased litigation, poten-
tially large damage awards, and increased administrative
burdens."20 When the Connecticut Legislature passed the Rec-
reational Use Act in 1971, the state retained substantial immu-
nity. The state legislates what liability or immunity is held by
municipalities. Municipalities in Connecticut have derivative
governmental immunity, with some exceptions. 201 In Connecti-
cut Statutes section 52-557n,20 2 the Connecticut Legislature de-
fined the liability of municipalities. The only mention of
municipal immunity concerning a recreational use area is in
section 52-557n(b)(4)203 which states that a political subdivision
shall not be liable for "the condition of an unpaved road, trail or
footpath, the purpose of which is to provide access to a recrea-
tional or scenic area, if the political subdivision has not received
notice and has not had a reasonable opportunity to make the
condition safe."20 4 The statute only mentions access to a recrea-
tional area and not the area itself. If the legislature had in-
tended to extend immunity for recreational areas to
municipalities, it could have done so here, especially since sec-
tion 52-557n was amended in 1992.
197. Abrogate is defined as to "annul, cancel, revoke, repeal or destroy."
BLAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 8 (6th ed. 1990).
198. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
199. Birmingham, supra note 68, at 304.
200. Id.
201. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 111.
203. See supra note 111.




The legislature rather than the judiciary has made these
decisions concerning the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 2 5 In
view of Justice Katz's dissent in Scrapchansky,26 which articu-
lates several reasons not to interpret the definition of "owner"
so as to include municipalities in the Connecticut Recreational
Use Statute, the legislature should statutorily clarify that defi-
nition.20 7 The author proposes that the Connecticut Recrea-
tional Use Statute should merely apply to private owners in
keeping with the original legislative purpose of the act, and any
modifications, changes, or additions to municipal immunity
should be made in section 52-557n.
C. The Public Policy Implications of Allowing Municipal
Landowners Immunity From Liability
Given that the issues of municipal immunity and liability
should be addressed statutorily outside the recreational use
statute, what is the public posture on tort liability that the state
should take? The ideal is for "the state [to] maximize commu-
nity well-being and minimize tort judgments."208 Admittedly, a
state feels an underlying tension between economic concerns
such as increased tort litigation and their subsequent monetary
judgments, and the concern for the well-being, health and
safety that the state has for its citizens. Does the state of Con-
necticut need the shield of public owner immunity in order to
open up land for recreational use that it otherwise would not
make available? Or is the court allowing municipalities to use
the shield of owner immunity when the municipality had long
established the area for public use without any thought of im-
205. Birmingham, supra note 68, at 304 (quoting Berger v. State, 130 A.2d
293, 295 (Conn. 1957) ("Mhe question whether the principles of governmental im-
munity from suit and liability can best serve this and succeeding generations has
become, by force of the long and firm establishment of these principles as prece-
dent, a matter for legislative, not judicial determination.' ')).
206. Scrapchansky, 627 A.2d at 1336 (Katz, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1336-40 ("Although we look to legislative inaction following a deci-
sion by this court to signify its acquiescence in our interpretation of a particular
section, the ink on Manning v. Barenz has barely dried.") (citation omitted). The
Manning court held that the term "owner" in the recreational use statute applied
to both private and public landowners. Justice Katz further stated that he, "there-
fore, hesitate(s] to draw any conclusion from the lack of legislative response to this
court's interpretation of the act." Id.




munity under the statute? In all fairness, the municipality
would be better able to bear the burden of damages resulting
from injury than an individual. For example, an individual us-
ing a playground does so in good faith that it is safe and that no
danger exists or harm will result. The public expects that the
municipality will take care of its members.
"Whereas the private landowner may have a strong incen-
tive (in the form of injury to herself [or himself] or her [or his]
friends and relatives) to keep her [or his] land safe regardless of
liability exposure, the municipality may 'depend' on liability as
an inducement to responsible conduct."20 9 When immunity is
applied to a municipality, it insulates the municipality from
causes of action in tort based on negligence and lack of due care.
The practical and economic result is that the municipality has
no sword motivating it to keep its recreational areas safe.210
The ordinary citizen would have no recourse in the case of lack
of due care by a municipality if the injury occurred while using
recreational areas such as playgrounds, ball fields, swimming
pools, tennis courts, and the like, when the municipality
charges no fee to enter that area. 211 On the other hand, when
the municipality is liable, any damage remedies resulting from
negligence that are paid by the municipality are spread among
the taxpayers. This increase in taxes is publicized, and results
in a self-correcting situation. Government officials make sure
that the situation is corrected, and that it does not happen
again. The public's remedy is two-fold: (1) compensation for in-
209. Ecker, supra note 194, at 34.
210. The New York Court of Appeals raised similar concerns about extending
New York's recreational use statute to already existing municipal recreational ar-
eas in its disposition of Ferres:
[T]he statute remains unchanged in one significant respect: it does not pro-
vide immunity to a municipality, which .... already operates and maintains
a supervised facility... for use by the public. Nothing in the wording of [the
statute] or its history supports defendant's construction which results in a
drastic reduction in a municipality's responsibility in the operation and
maintenance of its supervised parks ....
Ferres, 68 N.Y.2d at 453-54, 502 N.E.2d at 977, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (emphasis
added).
211. An essential element of immunity under the recreational use statute is
that no fee is charged. CoNN. GmN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557g(a) (West 1991) (only
those landowners who make land available for recreational users "without charge,




jury; and (2) removal of those in office who do not exercise re-
sponsibility and care. Exercise of due care is a fundamental
basis of our tort system-the incentive of avoiding liability
keeps it functional, and the remedy of damages when that duty
fails gives fair redress. At the very least, the public must be
informed of what position its government has taken on tort lia-
bility. A citizen probably will not tolerate the fact that public
recreation areas are supported by tax dollars, but the public has
no redress for injury on those lands. The situation is particu-
larly egregious when the recreational area is small and encom-
passes parks, playing fields and swimming pools.21 2
Because economic realities drive many decisions, munici-
palities can always cover potential liability with insurance cov-
erage. The cost of municipal liability insurance coverage can be
spread among the public, and no one private person would have
to bear alone the cost arising from tort injury. When it comes
down to either the government or a private party being respon-
sible for injury, it is always easier for government to bear the
burden, even though ultimately the compensation is paid by
taxpayer dollars. Municipalities are faced with an economic
tension to maximize community well-being on the one hand,
and to minimize money paid in tort judgments on the other
hand. The legislature must face this problem head on and give
statutory guidance to the courts.
If the legislature does decide to give municipalities recrea-
tional immunity, it should be clearly distinguished from the rec-
reational use statute. For example, an amendment could be
made to an existing statute that governs municipal immunity,
such as section 52-557n. Or, public landowners could be held
liable in tort generally, with exceptions for specific situations
enumerated in a statute.
V. Conclusion
The Connecticut Legislature was motivated to encourage
private landowners to open their lands to the public in return
for limited liability because more recreational land was needed.
212. This assumes that there is no charge for entrance onto the land for recre-
ational use. Otherwise, the recreational statute immunity would not apply. See




Municipal landowners, however, are not in the same position.
If there are municipal financial problems to be faced and bal-
anced against the public's need for safety and redress against
tort injury, these public policies must be addressed specifically
by the legislature. There was no intention to include govern-
ment entities in "owner" immunity when the Connecticut Recre-
ational Use Statute was enacted by the legislature in 1971.
Now, more than twenty years after the passage of the statute,
and in light of the Connecticut Supreme Court's decisions in
Manning and Scrapchansky, it is time to reassess the situation
and to evaluate the application of the recreational use statute,
clearing up ambiguities that have been manifested as cases
have come to court, and redefining terms where necessary.
It is, therefore, the legislature, rather than the judiciary,
which must resolve the issue of immunity where land has been
put aside for the recreational use of the public. The prudent
result would be for the legislature to state that recreational use
statutes apply only to "private owners," and to handle any
changes in municipal liability under separate codification, or to
amend already existing statutes which pertain to liability of
municipalities. The Scrapchansky dissent challenges the Con-
necticut Legislature to clarify its legal intent concerning the
definition of "owner."
Dissents are important factors in the evolution of the law.
Often the dissent of today becomes the law of tomorrow.
The value of separate opinions to the scientific observer of a prece-
dent system is exceptionally great. The judge who writes a sepa-
rate opinion deals with the same fact situation, based on the same
record, same precedents, or statutes, and same attorneys' argu-
ments, and has participated in the same panel deliberations, as
the author of the court's opinion. His utterances constitute an
equally legitimate historical source. No scholar looking at a case
afterward can make the same claim. Indeed, the separate opinion
can give a scholar reviewing the case an otherwise unattainable
glimpse into the essence of decision making and how it happens,
into the nature of judicial thinking....
In the very determination of the facts, artful-even artificial-
conclusions and deductions have been drawn. But when one sees
a second judge at work, when a significant point in his opinion




version, we cannot avoid realizing that everything is not quite as
simple as it might first have seemed. 213
Hopefully, the Scrapchansky dissent will serve as the impetus
for the Connecticut Legislature specifically to define the issue of
municipal immunity, both under the recreational use statute
and in general, taking into careful consideration the safety and
protection of the community.
Joan M. O'Brien*
213. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA § 42, at 52-54
(1989).
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